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THE NEW YUGOSLAV CRIMINAL CODE
RICHARD C, DONNELLY*
THE new Yugoslav Criminal Code,' which became effective on July 1, 1951,
is of twofold interest to students of criminal law. First of all, it is a con-
temporary specimen of codification. More importantly, it is an instrument
reflecting the ideological assumptions of a Communist State.
The achievement of justice in criminal cases depends upon four interact-
ing variables: personnel, administration, procedure, and the substantive law
of crimes. Criminal law reformers have been concerned chiefly with the first
three. For example, there have been important studies of crime causation
and legal responsibility. The revulsion against retribution as the aim of punish-
ment-generated by Nineteenth Century Humanitarianism-has been fortified
by the new insights into human motivation revealed by the behavior sciences.
The development of probation, parole, and other release procedures as alter-
natives to penal commitment, and the individualization of sentencing and
treatment, are other trends of significance. The American Law Institute's
Code of Criminal Procedure and the recent Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure have given impetus to needed improvements in criminal procedure.
In the end, however, criminal justice must rest upon a satisfactory sub-
stantive law of crimes. Although Great Britain and the United States stand
in the vanguard of the penological reform movement, the forces directing
this movement have shown little interest in the criminal law proper. In fact,
the substantive law of crimes in the United States remains uncertain, obscure,
formally defective, inconsistent and antiquated. 2 If by codification is meant
the effort to simplify, synthesize and systematize law by the positive legis-
lative formulation of inclusive and operationally defined principles, Great
Britain and the United States have lagged far behind Continental countries.
There are compilations of statutes, sometimes designated as codes and some-
times not, but these are rarely systematic bodies of law. There have been
sporadic and haphazard amendments to the statutes but these have been
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1. An English translation of the Code appears in 2 Nzv YuaosLAv L., No. 2-3,
pp. 39-115 (1951). This periodical is published by the Federation of Jurists' Associations
of Yugoslavia.
The same issue contains a speech by Minister of Justice Frane Frol before the joint
session of Legislative Committees of the National Assembly, which considered the Draft
Code. I have relied heavily upon this speech as an official statement of the policies behind
and the objectives of the Code.
2. Mikell, The Criminal Code of Pennsylvania, 65 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 232 (1917);
Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COL. L. Rav. 701 (1937);
POUND, CRIMINAL JusTIcE IN AMERICA 142-8 (1930); MANNIEIM, CRIMINAL JusTICa
AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION (1946).
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mostly patch-work jobs. Except for the 1942 Louisiana Code,3 there have
been but few major efforts to codify the substantive law of crimes.&4
On the Continent a considerable number of new codes have been adopted.
These reflect ideas of criminology and criminal policy which have developed
since the era of the Napoleonic Code. The twenties and thirties witnessed
the Soviet penal codes of 1922 and 1926, the Yugoslav Criminal Code of
1929,5 the draft of the German Penal Code of 1930, the Italian Penal Code
of 1930, the preliminary draft of the general part of the French Code of
1932, the Polish Penal Code of 1932, and the Swiss Federal Criminal Code
of 1937. In 1950, Czechoslovakia enacted a new Criminal Code 0 and in
1951, the new Greek Code and Yugoslav Code became effective.
Codification in the United States will be more meaningful in terms of
content as well as formal statement if the codes of other systems are studied.
The systematic study and knowledge of what is going on in other countries
is indispensable if we would make our system of criminal law the best possi-
ble instrument of justice. Furthermore, a modem codification prepared on
the basis of comparative studies should encourage American legal scholars
to participate more effectively than in the past in ventures in international
collaboration.ea A second reason for interest in the new Yugoslav Code is
that "the criminal law has, quite rightly, been called one of the most faithful
mirrors of a given civilization, reflecting the fundamental values on which
the latter rests."7 The formulation of a criminal code not only entails value
judgments as to the sort of social order desired. It also includes a policy
decision regarding the extent to which the criminal law is an effective and
desirable instrument for protecting and fostering the values and institutions
which are favored in a given society.
The draftsmen of the Yugoslav Criminal Code obviously were influenced
by Soviet legal theory. This theory, following the lines of classical Marxian
thought, originally looked upon the State and Law as superstructures erected
3. La. Act 43 of 1942. And see, Smith, How Louisiana Preparcd and Adopted a
Criminal Code, 41 J. Cams. L. & C~mhioLoGry 125 (1950).
4. For a general review of codification see DEssioN, CmIht .AL LAw, AmIrasTm-
ToN AND PUBLIC ORDE 393-6 (1948) and DAvI DUDLEY Fnn: Cmm.-uAny ESSAYS
(Reppy ed. 1949).
In 1935 the American Law Institute approved the preparation of a model criminal
code. The project, which has lain dormant, has recently been revived.
5. For a discussion of this earlier Yugoslav Code as well as the Codes of Poland
and Czechoslovakia, consult Gsovsxi, NEW CoNEs IN THE SL&VIC CouNrMs (1934).
6. A French translation of the New Czech Code appears in & BuLLnmri D, DomT
TcHcosSLovAquE 457 (1950). A supplement to volume 30 of the Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology contains an English translation of the Swiss Federal Criminal
Code of 1937.
6a. Current deliberations under the auspices of the United Nations on the project
for an international criminal code is a case in point. For a series of articles on the sub-
ject see 46 Am. J. INT' L. 1 et seq. (1952).
7. MANNEM-M, CRAL JusTIcE AND Sow.m R~co.,sTnucnoN 2 (1946).
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upon the foundations of bourgeois society. They were to be utilized by a
proletarian dictatorship only for the relatively short transitional period pre-
ceding the achievement of collectivism. As long as law was regarded as a
"bourgeois fetish" bound to "wither away" a specific theory of Socialist law
was impossible. With the realization of socialism in the thirties, Soviet theory
began to resurrect the State as a mechanism essential to the organization of
a Socialist society which would endure for an indefinite period. This shift
in outlook decisively changed the perspective of Soviet legal theory. Instead
of withering away, law was restored on a large scale not only as a necessary
base for a stable society but as a positive tool for securing and developing
the Socialist order.8 A similar view was taken by the Yugoslav draftsmen.
They consider the Criminal Code an instrument for the development of
socialism. This is clear from the concept of crime which it enunciates.
CONCEPT OF CRIME
The objective of the Code is stated in Article 1 to be the protection "from
violence, arbitrary treatment, economic exploitation and other socially dan-
gerous acts, [of] the person of citizens, their rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Constitution and laws; [of] the political, national, economic and social
foundations of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, its inde-
pendence and security, its socialist social order and state organization estab-
lished by the Constitution and law." This protection is to be achieved by
"determining which socially dangerous acts shall be considered as criminal
offences, by prescribing punishments, measures of security and educational-
reformatory measures, and by application of such punishments and measures
towards perpetrators of criminal offences through a procedure determined
by law." Article 4 then defines a criminal offense as "a socially dangerous
act, the elements of which are defined by law."
This notion of crime as a "socially dangerous act" is not new. It is found
in the writings of the Italian Positivists, and the Soviet law makers were
the first to put the idea into positive law.10 The principle of social danger
8. This change in Soviet legal theory is discussed in Berman, Principles of Soviet
Criminal Law, 56 YALE L. J. 803 (1947) ; Starosolsky, Basic Principles of Soviet Cri-
minal Law, 28 N.C.L. REv. 359 (1950); Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study
in the Development of Marixian Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. Rzv. 1157 (1949). More
elaborate studies are SCHLESINGER, SoviET LEGAL THEORY (1945); SoviET LEGAL Pil-
LOSOPHY (translated by Babb and including excerpts from the writings of Lenin, Pashu-
kanis, Vyshinsky, Trainin and others. 1951) ; and BERMAN, JusTIcE IN RussIA (1950).
9. See, e.g., FRRI, CIMINAL SOCIOLOGY 318-64, 454 (1917). In 1921, Ferri presented
a draft of an Italian Criminal Code based upon the idea of social danger rather than
guilt and upon measures of social defense rather than punishment. This draft, which was
not accepted, is discussed in CANTOR, CRIME AND Sociary 214-19 (1939).
10. The Criminal Code of the Russian Republic provides:
"Art. 1. The penal legislation of the R.SF.S.R. has the task of protecting the
socialist state of workers and peasants and the established order therein against
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initially discarded guilt as the touchstone of criminal responsibility. "Mea-
sures of social defense" were substituted for punishment. 1 Recently the
Vishinsky era occasioned a retreat from the original position. Both "guilt"
and "punishment" are now discussed in the commentaries, textbooks, and
articles. The present theory is that "social danger" is but the objective and
material characteristic of a crime. Guilt is the subjective element.12
For the Yugoslavs as well, a criminal offense is more than a formal breach
of law. The behavior must also constitute a danger to the social order which
the criminal law was designed to protect and foster. Even though an act
includes all the elements of a particular offense, Article 4 provides that it
shall not be considered a criminal offense if it represents "insignificant social
danger because of its slight importance and because of the insignificance or
absence of detrimental consequences."1 3
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
In a time characterized by rapid political, economic and social change, the
criminal law can fulfill its functions only if some technique can be devised
to make it more readily adaptable than it has been. Some of the possibilities
are: (1) the use of general terms; (2) the use of analogy in the interpretation
of criminal statutes; or (3) periodic revision. The first two alternatives
collide with the principle of legality.14 On the Continent this principle has
socially-dangerous acts by applying to persons committing them the measures of
social defense set forth in the present Code.
Art. 6. Every act or omission is considered socially dangerous which is directed
against the Soviet regime, or which violates the order of things established by the
workers' and peasants' authority for the period of transition to a Communist regime."
With respect to social danger, Professor Mannheim has observed that the function
of the criminal law is no longer primarily to protect individual rights and interests, but
at least as much to protect the rights and interests of the community at large. MAN;-
HEMI, CRIMINAL JusTIcE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCrION 195 (1946).
11. PASH -iux Is, THE GEaERA THEORY OF LAW AND 1MA S.xxsM IN SO%= LGAr
PHiLosoPnY 111, 207-25 (1951).
12. Berman, Principles of Soviet Crimidnal Law, 5b YALE .J. 803, 805 (1947);
Trainin, Fwzdamental Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 95 L. J. 259 (1945); Starosol-
sky, Basic Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 28 N.C.L. REv. 359, 366 (1950).
13. The Soviet Codes contain a similar provision. For example:
"If a particular act is a crime within the meaning of Article 6 above at the
moment when it is committed, but by the time it comes up for investigation or trial
it has lost its socially dangerous character by reason of a change in the penal
law or by virtue of the fact of the alteration of the social-political situation, or
if the person who performed the act cannot now in the opinion of the court be con-
sidered socially dangerous, the act shall not render the person who performed
it liable to the application of a measure of social defense." CrmmAL Com', R. S.
F.S.R., ART. &
14. For a thoughtful study of the principle of legality, consult HALL, GEmun.L
PRINCIPLES OF CnmmrzNA. LAw 19 (1947) .
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been formulated with definite reference to the criminal law in the phrase
nulla poena, nullum crimen sine lege. Its implications are that no act shall
be punished unless it was previously made punishable by law (nulin
crimen), and that the actual penalty for a punishable act must likewise be
legally predetermined (nulla poena sine lege). In American law the principle
has found expression in the rule that penal statutes are to be construed
strictly against the state and in favor of the accused, 1r in ex post facto and
bill of attainder provisions,x6 in the constitutional prohibition on vaguely
drawn statutes,' 7 and in the eitsdern generis limitation on catch-all statutory
provisions.' 8
On June 28, 1935, the German government adopted a statute which was
regarded in many quarters as a flagrant manifestation of the legal philosophy
of National Socialism. It provided:
"He shall be punished who commits an action which the law (e-
dares to be punishable or which is deserving of punishment according
to fundamental ideas of a penal law and the sound perception of the
people. If no determinate penal law is directly applicable to the action,
15. Professor Livingston Hall has demonstrated that the strict view on the con-
struction of criminal statutes is wavering. Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
Statutes, 48 HAxv. L. Rmv. 748 (1935).
16. U.S. CoNsT. ART. I, §§ 9 & 10.
17. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
659 (1939).
The proper legislative technique for drafting criminal statutes presents a difficult
problem. Soviet legislators have been criticized because of their predilection for general
and vague terms. On the other hand,the opposite extreme of using narrow and detailed
definitions has had disappointing results and has probably encouraged evasions. The
technically most accomplished Penal Codes, such as the Swiss Code of 1937, take a
middle of the road approach with a slight bias towards the use of general terms and the
elimination of avoidable detail. The Reporters who prepared the draft of the Louisiana
Code followed a similar path. "It has been the consistent policy of the Reporters to
draft the individual articles as concisely as possible. To avoid resorting to lengthy enu-
merations, broad terms have been used whenever practicable, but only after careful
consideration of pertinent decisions and commentaries to guard against the selection of
terms that might be too inclusive." LOUISIANA STATE LAw INSTITUTE, PRojEcT bF A
CRIMINAL CODE FOR THE STATE oF LOuISIANA viii (1942).
Although the use of wide and ambiguous terms is incompatible with the principle
of legality and offends constitutional prohibitions on vagueness, American lawyers should
not be too self-righteous about this. For example, the conception of conspiracy in Anglo-
American law is "elastic, sprawling and pervasive." Justice Jackson, concurring, in Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949). Other pneumatic concepts are "public
mischief" [King v. Manley [1933] 1 K. B. 592], "vagrancy" (Note, 59 YALr. L. J. 1351
(1950), "obscene" (Judge Jerome Frank concurring in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788,
794 (2d Cir. 1949), and "sacrilegious" (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 101 NE. 2d
665) (N.Y. Ct. Appeals 1951).
18. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); United States v. Alpers,
338 U.S. 680 (1950).
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it shall be punishable according to the law, the basic idea of which
fits it best."1 9
Next to the National Socialist Act, Article 16 of the Soviet Penal Codes
has become the most widely known provision in favor of punishment by
analogy. This article declares:
"Where a socially dangerous act has not been expressly dealt with
in the present code, the basis and limits of responsibility in respect
thereof shall be determined in conformity with those articles of the
code which deal with the crimes most closely resembling it."
Once crime is defined as a socially dangerous act, punishment by analogy
is logically unavoidable. Behavior not specifically condemned but similar to
that which is may be socially dangerous. Analogy is merely the converse of
the proposition that there is no criminal responsibility for an act which meets
the particular elements of a crime but lacks social danger.2
Punishment by analogy is not a sine qua non for a tyrannical state. Italy,
for example, forbade analogy. Yet, by the use of widely drawn statutes and
extra-legal techniques, the Fascists achieved a police state.21 On the other
hand, a democratic country like Denmark permits it. -2 Analogy is, however,
symptomatic of governments that place the protetion of the State from the
risk of disorder far above the protection of the individual from the risk of
oppression.2 Nevertheless, it is naive to assume that the mere prohibition
of analogy will safeguard civil liberty.
19. This statute is discussed in Note, The Use of Analogy in Cri minal Lou?, 47 CoL.
L REv. 613, 615 (1947) and MANNHEIM, CRmIN.AL JusTICE Alm SoCIr. REcoNsmnuc-
Tiox 208 (1946).
20. The use of analogy in Soviet law is examined in Berman, Principles of Saict
Criminal Law, 56 YALE L. J. 803, 809 (1947); Starosolsky, Basic Principlcs of Sozi!
Criminal Law, 28 N.C.L REv. 359, 369 (1950). Also consult HAzAIR & W Vsm,
CASES AN READINGS ON Soviar LAw 50 (mimeo. 1950).
21. Weidenbaum, Liberal TtWught and Undefined Crimes, 19 J. Comp. .xr. & Iz.TL
L (3d ser.) 90, 96 (1937).
22. MANIM, CsMN.AL JusrIC AND SOcIAL REcoxsraucroN 203 (1946).
23. Two months after the enactment of the German statute introducing analogy, the
Senate of the Free City of Danzig adopted a similar provision. This was reviewed by
the Permanent Court of International Justice and found to be inconsistent with the fun-
damental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Danzig.
"The problem of the repression of crime may be approached from tvo different
standpoints, that of the individual and that of the community. From the former
standpoint, the object is to protect the individual against the State: this object
finds its expression in the maxim Nulla poena sine lege. From the second stand-
point, the object is to protect the community against the criminal, the basic prin-
ciple being the notion Nullum crimen sine poena. The decrees of August 29th,
1935, are based on the second of these conceptions; the Danzig Constitution is
based upon the former. For this Constitution takes as its starting-point the fun-
damental rights of the individual; these rights may indeed be restricted, as already
19521
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The Yugoslav Code abandons analogy. The return to the principle of
legality was extolled by Minister Frol as follows:
"[TIhe application of criminal-juridical sanctions cannot and must
not be left to wilful and arbitrary practices but must be established
by the law itself. This means that the realization of protection of our
socialistic social and state order from criminal offences must be sought
through law, that the principle of legality must be honoured to the
fullest extent....
"Today we are in a position to abandon analogy in virtue of enacting
a complete and unified Criminal Code.... In this manner the proposed
draft binds even closer together the basic element of any criminal
offence, the social danger, with the familiar principle of 'nullum
crimen sine lege', which marks a new advance of our socialist legality
in the sphere of criminal law."1
24
This eulogy must be taken with skepticism because Minister Frol, after
praising the Special Part 25 of the Code for its definiteness and concreteness
of statement and its avoidance of vague and flexible terms, sounded this
warning:
"All this signifies the consolidation of the principle of legality in the
province of criminal law and a guarantee for the successful realisation
of that principle. But even so, sheer facts are not, nor can they
be, the concepts employed for the determination of elements of in-
dividual crimes under the draft as this would be reducing the role of
pointed, out, in the general public interest, but only in virtue of a law which must
itself specify the conditions of such restriction, and, in particular, determine the
limit beyond which an act can no longer be justified as an exercise of a fundamental
liberty and becomes a punishable offence. It must be possible for the individual
to know, beforehand, whether his acts are lawful or liable to punishment.'
Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free
City, Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Opinion, December 4, 1935.
Publications of the Court, Series A/B No. 65, at 41, 56, 57. This opinion is abstracted
in DFSION, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDa 142 (1948).
24. Frol, A Summary of the Draft Criminal Code, 2 NEw YUGOSLAV L. 4, 8 (1951).
The pertinent articles of the Code are as follows:
"Article 2. No punishment may be imposed on anyone for acts which, prior to
being committed, did not constitute criminal offences under the law and concerning
which no punishment had been prescribed for the perpetrators thereof.
Article 26(1). Punishment of death, imprisonment, detention and confiscation of
,property may be imposed only when so prescribed by law for a specified criminal
offence."
25. The Yugoslav Code follows the pattern of the more highly developed penal
codes in that it is divided into a General and a Special Part. The General Part sets
forth major principles of general applicability. It is followed by a Special Part con-
taining sixteen chapters classifying and defining particular offenses and prescribing the
applicable punishment.
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the Court to a purely mechanical-logical function of subsumption. The
draft, on the contrary, includes a considerable number of concepts the
implications of which are due to be determined only on the strength
of definitive appraisal and binding together with the other concepts
embraced by the Criminal Code or on the basis of our legal order
generally or, ultimately, on the basis of our socialistic development. A
correct application of the Criminal Code is impossible by those who
ignore the laws of our social development, who do not perceive the
trend of our general state policy and the live dialectics of events in all
stages of our socialist progress. Without such prerequisites it is im-
possible to pinpoint the true context of the many concepts employed
in the draft in constructing the substance of criminal offences. The
tendency, then, to fix the substance of criminal offences as concretely
as possible under the proposed Code should by no means be taken to
denote their simultaneous petrifaction into lifeless and static moulds.
The substance of criminal offences epitomizes the types of socially
dangerous phenomena, life's evolutions, that is, which are subject to
perpetual motion. It is for this reason that they cannot be correctly
perceived if they are treated in an isolated manner, statically and
divorced from the dynamics of our daily reality."2 0
RESPONSIBILITY
Although the Yugoslav Code defines crime as a socially dangerous act,
criminal liability is not based upon the act or its consequences alone. It re-
quires a mental element as well. Liability presupposes fault which may take
the form of intent or negligence. Each of these states of mind is further sub-
divided. The intent is direct when the actor "was aware of his act and wanted
to commit it." It is indirect when he "was aware that a prohibited consequence
might result from his action or omission and consented to it." An offense is
committed by negligence when the actor was aware that a prohibited con-
sequence might result from his act but "wantonly assumed" that it would
not occur or that he would be able to prevent it. And even though the actor
was unaware of the possibility of a prohibited consequence resulting from
his act, he is criminally negligent if, under the circumstances and "by his
personal qualities" he should have foreseen such a possibility.-2T
If the actor's conduct resulted from a non-negligent mistake of fact the
required mental element is lacking and he is exempt from criminal liability.2s
On the other hand, ignorance of law, even if the offender "for justified rea-
sons did not know that such an act was prolibited," is not a defense. In the
latter case, however, the court may inflict a reduced punishment or may even
release the offender from punishment.29
26. Frol, A Summary of the Draft Criminal Code, 2 NEw YVaosLAv L. 4, 19 (1951).
27. Art. 17. 28. Art. 9.
29. Art. 10.
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Insanity is recognized as a defense and both medical and legal criteria
are utilized.30 Persons who commit an offense while "in a state of lasting or
temporary mental disease, temporary mental derangement or defective mental
development" are not responsible if "owing to such a state of mind he was
unable to understand the significance of his act (intellectual factor) or con-
trol his conduct (volitional factor)."31 "Partial insanity" is recognized to the
extent that the court may mitigate the punishment. "Measures of Security"
are applied to persons found to be insane or partially insane. They are sent
to special institptions for treatment. The time spent in such an institution
by a partially insane person is applied on his sentenceY2 Intoxication is
specifically excluded as a defense. 8
PREPARATION AND AT'rEMPT
The Special Part of the Code contains a few provisions making attempts
to commit designated offenses punishable.3 4 Other cases are covered by general
Article 16 which provides that whoever "intentionally commences commit-
ting a criminal offence but does not complete it shall be punished for attempt"
only if the consummated offense be one punishable with five years of im-
prisonment or more. When an attempt is made to commit an offense im-
possible of commission under the circumstances, the court may reduce the
punishment or even release the offender from punishment."0 If the actor
voluntarily abstains from completing an attempted offense the court may re-
lease him from punishment.30
The Code recognizes that an attempt requires more than mere preparation.
Criminal liability for preparatory acts is exceptional and exists only when
explicitly denounced in the Special Part.37 These special situations are: pre-
paring to commit offenses undermining the military and defense power of
the state ;3S preparing to commit armed insurrection ;39 or assassination ;40 and
preparing to destroy "social property."'
30. Art. 6.
31. For discussion of insanity in Soviet Law, consult Berman & Hunt, Crinial
Law and Psychiatry: The Soviet Solution, 2 STAN. L. REv. 635 (1950) ; Killian & Arens,
Psychiatry in Soviet Criminal Proceedings, 41 J. CGM. L. & CmwiNOLOGy 136 (1950),
32. Art. 61. 33. Art. 6.
34. For example, infringement of inviolability of dwelling (Art. 154); manufacture
and use of false measures and weights (Art. 232) ; blackmail (Art. 262) ; preventing a
person in office from performing official acts (Art. 289); and destruction of official
records (Art. 295).
35. Art. 17. 36. Art. 18.
37. Art. 121. 38. Art. 102.
39. Art. 104. 40. Art. 103.
41. Art. 114.
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COMPLICITY
In most legal systems the criminal liability of persons who combine for
the purpose of performing unlawful acts or join in the commission of crime
is determined by the nature and extent of their participation. Different patterns
of participation are conceptualized, in Anglo-American law, in doctrines deal-
ing with principals, accessories, and conspirators. In addition, various statutes
are directed against collective criminality.4
Under the Yugoslav Code, whoever intentionally "incites" or intentionally
"assists" another to commit a crime shall be punished as if he himself had
committed it.43 If the instigation or assistance induces an attempt instead of
a consummated offense, the "instigator and the assistant" shall be punished
for an attempt 4 4 If the instigation is entirely unsuccessful and if the solicited
offense carries a punishment of imprisonment for five years or more the "in-
stigator" shall be punished for an attempt. 0
A number of articles penalize participation in groups and combinations.
Article 104 makes it a crime to take part in an armed insurrection and Article
302 punishes participation in a crowd which by joint action commits certain
serious offenses. Both articles punish ringleaders and organizers more severely
than mere participants.
Article 23 is a general provision concerned with the organizers of criminal
associations. Whoever "creates or exploits an organization, band, conspiracy,
group or some other association for the purpose of committing criminal
offences shall be punished for all criminal offences resulting from the criminal
plan of such associations as if he himself had committed them." According
to Minister Frol, this article reflects the "attitude on the criminal liability
of organisers found ... in the familiar Nuremberg sentences, thereby acquir-
ing the undisputed international authority it enjoys today.' 40 This general
article does not exhaust the problem of collective criminality. The Special Part
of the Code contains particular provisions condemning organizational activities
of various types and there are specific references to conspiracies.
It is an offense to organize a group for the purpose of committing crimes
for which a punishment of imprisonment for five years or more is available.47
Membership alone in such a group is subject to milder punishment. An in-
42. The Smith Act is a specimen. IS U.S.C. § 23S5. It punishes
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruc-
tion of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of,
or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, lmowing the
purposes thereof."
A perceptive study of collective criminality is Arens, Nuremberg and Group Prose-
cution, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 329.
43. Art. 19-20. 44. Art. 21.
45. Art. 19.
46. Frol, A Summary of the Draft Criminal Code, 2 NE-w YUGoSLAV L. 12 (1951).
47. Art. 299.
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former provision exculpates from punishment a member who exposes the
group. Article 117 makes it a crime to form a plot, band or any other group
of persons for the purpose of committing specified offenses against the
security of the state. Organizers are punishable by imprisonment for not less
than five years or by death. Membership is punishable "by imprisonment."
This article, as well, contains an informer clause. It is also an offense to
organize a group for the purpose of committing crimes against humanity and
international law.48
The general conspiracy article provides that whoever "conspires with an-
other person to commit a particular criminal offence for which a punishment
of imprisonment for five years or a heavier punishment may be pronounced
by law shall be punished by detention for not more than one year." 40 Con-
spiring to commit specified offenses against the national security is con-
demned. 50
SANCTIONS
The Italian Positivists, as indicated above, substituted the sociological
categories of "socially dangerous act" and "measures of social defense" for
"crime" and "punishment." 51 This terminology was adopted by the Soviet
Code which explains, in its General Section, that criminal sanctions consist
of measures of social defense. 52 These measures "do not pursue the object of
inflicting physical sufferings or degradation of human dignity; they do not
pursue the object of retribution or punishment."''  The Vishinsky era has,
however, provided a shift in emphasis. Soviet theory now recognizes a posi-
tive value in the juridical approach to crime, punishment and guilt.5
4
Article 3 of the Yugoslav Code declares that the purpose of punishment is:
to prevent activity perilous to society; to prevent the offender from committing
criminal offenses and to reform him; to exercise educational influence on
other people in order to deter them from committing criminal offenses; and
to influence the development of social morals and social discipline among
citizens.
Seven types of punishment are prescribed by Article 24: death (shooting
or hanging) ; imprisonment; detention; limitation of civil rights; prohibition
48. Art. 128.
49. Art. 298. 50. Art. 121.
51. CANTOR, CRIME AND SOCIETY 215 (1939).
52. CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.F.S.R., ART. 1. These measures are of three types: judicial-
correctional, medical, or medical-educational. CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.F.S.R., ART. 7. They
are applied to prevent the commission of further crimes by the same offenders; to i-
fluence other unstable members of society; and to adapt the offenders to the conditions
of the community life of the toiler's state. Id. ART. 9.
53. CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.F.S.R., ART. 9.
54. This shift is discussed in Starosolsky, Basic Principles of Soviet Criminal Law,
28 N.C.L. Rzv. 359, 371-4 (1950) ; Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 YALE
L. J. 803, 808, 829 (1947) ; and BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 270-80 (1950).
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to exercise a specified profession; confiscation of property; and fine. These
sanctions are subdivided into principal and accessory punishments. The death
penalty, imprisonment, and detention are the only forms of principal punish-
ment. The others are accessory punishments except the fine which may be
imposed either as a principal or an accessory sanction.5
The death penalty is reserved for such grave offenses as counter-revolu-
tionary activities,5 6 espionage,57 assassination,56 and sabotage. 2 Even in those
cases it is not mandatory and the court may choose between capital punish-
ment and a time sentence. Furthermore, the court may always impose im-
prisonment for life in lieu of the sentence of deathYc ) In all other cases a
sentence of imprisonment cannot be for less than six months nor in excess
of twenty years.61 Detention cannot be for less than three days nor in excess
of five years.6 2 Both entail obligatory labor. Persons sentenced to imprison-
ment usually are assigned to physical work while those sentenced to detention
are assigned to work corresponding to their technical skills and capacities.c3
Detentioners are subject to a milder regime with respect to mailing and visit-
ing privileges.
64
The punishment of limitation of civil rights disables a person from taking
part in public life. It includes the loss of suffrage, the right to hold office in
social organizations and associations and the right to public appearance 5 The
incapacity may be permanent or for a term. It is pronounced as permanent
whenever the offender is sentenced to death or when a death sentence is com-
muted to life imprisonment.66 It can be given for a term only when the
offender is sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years and, in
exceptional cases, with sentences of two to five years. 7 The punishment of
prohibition to exercise a profession may likewise be permanent or for a term.
Permanent proscription may be pronounced only against a person sentenced
to imprisonment for not less than three years. Prohibition for a term may not
be less than for three months nor in excess of five years. This punishment
is imposed when the offender has abused his profession for the purpose of
committing a crime or "when his further exercise of such a profession is
dangerous.
'6s
55. Art. 25. 56. Art. 100.
57. Art. 105. 58. Art. 103.
59. Art. 115. Minister Frol justifies the retention of the death penalty as follows:
"In the present situation we cannot renounce that harshest of expedients for the pro-
tection of certain particularly important social relations. Nevertheless, this type of punish-
ment has the meaning of an exceptional and extreme measure in our penal system.'
Frol, A Sumnmry of the Draft Criminal Code, 2 NEW Yuosr.Av L. 4, 14 (1951).
60. Art. 29.
61. Art. 28. 62. Art. 30.
63. Art. 54. 64. Art. 55.
65. Art. 31. 66. Art. 32.
- 67- Art. 33. 68. Art. 35.
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The Code gives the court a wide discretion in imposing punishment. In no
case is an indiscriminate sanction required. Usually the court can choose
between types as well as the duration of punishment. For example, a person
found guilty of sabotage may be punished by imprisonment for not less than
two years or by death;G9 negligent homicide is punishable by detention for
not less than six months or by imprisonment for not more than five years ;70
and for non-payment of alimony either a fine or detention for not more than
one year can be inflicted . 7 In fixing the punishment the court must take into
account aggravating and extenuating circumstances and especially "the degree
of criminal liability, motives from which the offence was committed, the in-
tensity of danger or injury to the protected object, circumstances under which
the offence was committed, past conduct of the offender, his personal con-
ditions and his bearing after the criminal offence. '72 In imposing a fine the court
must take into account the "property position" of the offender.78 An offense
"in recidive" is always considered an aggravating circumstance. An offense
is "in recidive" when the offender has formerly been convicted of an in-
tentionally committed criminal offense and has within five years after com-
pletion of his sentence intentionally committed another offense for which the
punishment of detention or a heavier punishment is prescribed.
74
Some of the articles in the Special Part of the Code provide that "in
especially grave cases" a more severe penalty shall be inflicted.76 In these
situations the heavier punishment is imposed if the offense "obtained an
exceptionally dangerous aspect by being committed with particular deter-
mination, persistence or ruthlessness, or by provoking particularly grave con-
sequences or because it was committed under especially aggravating cir-
cumstances."'76 Conversely, when there are extenuating circumstances which
indicate "the possibility of the purpose of punishment being attained even
with a lighter punishment" the court may impose a punishment below the
limits prescribed by law or pronounce a lighter kind.77 Under some circum-
stances, such as a mistake of law 78 or exceeding the limits of self defense,70
the court may release the offender from any punishment at all.
Articles 54 and 55 are of interest in that they deal with the rights of
persons sentenced to imprisonment or detention. Although they are obliged
to work, the working day is fixed at eight hours and the work week includes
69. Art. 115. 70. Art. 137.
71. Art. 197. 72. Art. 38.
73. Art. 39. 74. Art. 40.
75. For example, Art. 218 (Disclosure of economic secrets); Art. 221 (Forgery
and uttering counterfeit currency); Art. 253 (larency and robbery); and Art. 320
(Disclosure of official secrets).
76. Art. 41.
77. Art. 42. 78. Art. 10.
79. Art. 11.
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a day of rest. Prisoners are guaranteed free medical protection, social insur-
ance benefits in case of accident, and mail and visiting privileges.
When a person is sentenced to detention up to two years or is given a
fine, the court may suspend execution of the sentence upon the condition
that the offender not intentionally commit another equally grave offense
within a stated period of time which may not be less than one year nor more
than five yearsSO A form of parole is provided in Article 56 entitled "Con-
ditional release." An offender may be conditionally released after serving
half of his sentence "if he proves by his work and behavior that he has
improved himself so much that he may be expected not to commit further
criminal offences." In exceptional cases where the offender particularly dis-
tinguishes himself by his work and behavior he may be conditionally released
before serving half of his sentence.
In addition to articles pertaining to amnesty and pardon,8 ' the Code pro-
vides for "Rehabilitation." This device should be considered with Article 51
which recites that the purpose of punishment is accomplished by execution
of the sentence. "Rehabilitation" provides a technique for nullifying the judg-
ment of conviction and "unconvicting" the convicted.82 Its purpose is to re-
move the stigma which accompanies a criminal record. There are two types
of rehabilitation: legal and judicial. Legal rehabilitation is limited to first
offenders or those who have been "unconvicted" of a previous conviction.
It is also limited to those who have been sentenced to detention for less than
two years and who have not committed a new offense within a specified period
after completing their sentence. judicial rehabilitation requires a court order
whereas legal rehabilitation is apparently automatic. Judicial rehabilitation
is available to first offenders who have been sentenced to detention for more
than two years or to imprisonment and to those who have more than one
conviction. After a lapse of eight years from the completion of his sentence
an offender may be judicially rehabilitated if the court feels that his behavior
deserves it and if he has made restitution of the damage caused by his offense
according to his ability to pay.
8 3
LIABILITY OF MINORS AND APPLICABLE SANCTIONS
Minors are divided into three categories: (1) Minors under fourteen;
(2) Minors over fourteen who are mentally immature; and (3) Minors over
fourteen who are mentally competent. A minor under fourteen is not crimi-
nally responsible and no criminal sanctions may be applied to him. s  He may,
however, be committed to a guardianship agency which decides whether to leave
him with his parents, place him with a guardian, or take other measures for
80. Art. 48.
81. Art. 84-S6. 82. Art. 87.
83. Art. 89. 84. Art. 5.
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his care and education.85 Minors over fourteen who, because of mental im-
maturity, are unable to understand the significance of their acts or control
their conduct are not responsible.8 0 As to them, only "educational-reformatory
measures" may be applied. They may be returned to their parents, assigned to a
guardian, or be sent to an educational institution.8 7 Minors fourteen years of
age and over who are sufficiently developed mentally to understand their acts
and control their conduct are responsible. Certain punishments, however,
cannot be pronounced against them: death, limitation of civil rights, and per-
manent prohibition to exercise a specified profession. In authorizing sanctions
the Code makes an additional distinction between junior minors (14-16)
and senior minors (16-18). A junior minor may be punished only if he has
committed an offense for which a punishment of more than ten years of
imprisonment is prescribed.8 8 In other cases, he is subject to educational-
reformatory measures-reprimand, or commitment to an educational-refor-
matory home. Even though the junior minor has committed an offense carry-
ing a punishment of more than ten years, the court may, in exceptional cases,
apply educational-reformatory measures."9 Senior minors must be given the
prescribed punishment if they commit an offense carrying a penalty of more
than five year's imprisonment. In other cases educational-reformatory mea-
sures may be imposed.9"
CLASSIFICATION Or CRIMES
Crime classification is a significant index to the values and cherished in-
stitutions of a particular society. The history of the criminal law has been
one of expansion. Increasing complexities and crises in societies have been
reflected in the extension of criminal and other sanctioning techniques to
the realms of trade and commerce, labor-management relations, ideological
conflicts, and national security. The extreme examples of this pervasiveness
are the police states.
A large number of crimes known to Western European and Anglo-Ameri-
can law are included in the Yugoslav Code. On the other hand, the social
and political system of Yugoslavia accounts for many that are not. The drafts-
men of the Code consciously undertook to reflect
"the characteristics of our socialistic social and state order, which
enjoys the protection of our legislation by way of determination of
criminal offences and the prescription of pertinent sanctions for same
... Here it is to be noted that, on account of the interconnection and
inter-dependence existing both between the natural and the social
phenomena, the categories of social relationships the draft adopts as
the basis of the Special Part of the Criminal Code are not, nor can
85. Art. 64. 86. Art.. 5.
87. Art. 65. 88. Art. 67.
89. Art. 68. 90. Art. 71.
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they be, static values sharply delimitated from one another. The state
order, national economy, legal order, civil service, socialistic property,
etc.-all these constitute categories which, in a socialist society, are
interwoven, mutually conditioned, inter-supplementary and which
merge to form the dynamic socialist reality. For that reason the in-
dividual socially dangerous pursuits frequently occur as a simultaneous
attack on more than one object of protection. It, therefore, depends
upon the legislator's evaluation and the respective penal policy as to
which category of social relationship shall be given precedence in classi-
fying single manifestations of socially dangerous conduct actually
threatening or violating a complex of social values."'O
Crimes are classified under sixteen headings: Crimes against the people and
the state; Crimes against humanity and International law; Crimes against
life and body; Crimes against freedom and rights of citizens; Crimes against
working relations; Crimes against honor and reputation; Crimes against
personal dignity and morals; Crimes against marriage and family; Crimes
against human health; Crimes against national economy; Crimes against
social and private property; Crimes against general safety of persons; Crimes
against justice; Crimes against public order; Crimes against official duty;
and Military crimes.
Crimes against the people and the state. It is not without significance that
this chapter comes first in the Special Part of the Code. It interdicts behavior
directed at the foundations of the social order. The chapter is subdivided
into twenty articles which define such offenses as counter-revolutionary ac-
tivities, insurrection, assassination, espionage, treason, and sabotage. The
punishments are severe and for most of the offenses the death penalty may
be imposed although it is nowhere mandatory. And even the offenses not
ordinarily carrying the death penalty are subject to it if committed "in a
state of emergency, mobilization or war, or if such offences cause a heavy
damage to the defensive or military power of the state or the case is other-
wise especially grave." -
Crimes against humanity and international law. This chapter is unique in
that Yugoslavia is the first country to incorporate these prescriptions into a
Criminal Code. It covers such offenses as genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. The definition of genocide follows closely that contained
in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Geno-
91. Frol, A Summary of the Draft Criminal Code, 2 NEw YUGOSLAV L 4, 19 (1951).
92. Art. 122. Article 119 bans the incitement of national, racial and religious hatred
and dissension. The closest offense in American law is group-libel but statutes of this
type have encountered constitutional objections on grounds of vagueness and as violative
of freedom of expression. See, Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform,
33 Mixx. L Rzv. 609, 623 (1949). An Illinois statute, however, was recently upheld
in People v. Beauharnais, 408 Ill. 512, 97 N.E. 2d 343, cert. granted, 342 U.S. 809 (1951).
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cide. 3 The other crimes are based largely upon the definitions contained in
Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, commonly
known as the Nuremberg Charter.94
Crimes against life and body. The traditional crimes of homicide, infanticide,
bodily injury, suicide, and abortion are defined in this chapter. Intentional
homicide is punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years. The
minimum is raised to ten years when committed under aggravated circum-
stances "in a cruel or surreptitious manner or in a manner endangering the
life of more persons, or for the purpose of benefit, or the purpose of commit-
ting or concealing another criminal offence, or from other base motives," or
when several persons are killed.05 "Instant homicide," which is defined as a
killing in a state of strong rage provoked by attack or "heavy insult" is sub-
ject to imprisonment for not more than ten years.90 Homicide by negligence
is punishable by detention for not less than six months or by imprisonment
for not more than five years.
7
Inciting another to commit suicide or assisting its commission or attempt
is punishable by detention for not less than six months or by imprisonment
for not more than five years.08 Instigating the suicide of a minor or a mental
defective entails a heavier penalty. And one who cruelly or inhumanly treats
one "placed in relation of subordination or dependence towards him and in
consequence of such treatment that person commits suicide, the former shall
be punished by detention for not less than three months or by imprisonment
for not more than five years."' 0
Article 147 is a so-called Good Samaritan provision typical of civil law
codes. One who "fails to offer help to a person exposed to immediate danger
of life, although he was able to do so without any danger to himself or any
other person, shall be punished by detention for not more than one year."
Crimes against the personal freedom and rights of citizens. This chapter
utilizes criminal sanctions as a technique for protecting constitutional guaran-
tees. It is a crime to deny or limit, because of national, racial or religious
differences, the constitutional rights of citizens. 100 Coercion is prohibited. 101
93. See, Comment, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L. J. 1142,
1157 (1949). Also consult SCHROEDER, INTERNATIONAL CRIME -AND TH U. S. CONSTI-
TUTION (1950) ; and McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Cons-ttutiom,
3 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1950).
94. The charter is set out in DEsslox, CRIMINAL LAw, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC
ORDER 36 (1948).
95. Art. 135. 96. Art. 136.
97. Art. 137. 98. Art. 139.
99. A curious provision of the Code is Art. 138 dealing with infanticide. It subjects
to detention for not less than six months a mother who kills her child during childbirth
or immediately thereafter while she is still "in the state of derangement provoked by
childbirth." If reference is being made to a post partum psychosis then the general article
on insanity (Art. 6) should relieve the mother from criminal liability,
100. Art. 148. 101. Art. 149.
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It is an offense to deprive a person of his freedom of movement.10 2 Officials
who extort statements from an accused or witness 103 or use their position
to mistreat others in any way "offensive to human dignity" are punisbable04
Other offenses are: Breaking into a dwelling without authorization ;105 un-
lawful search ;106 violating the secrecy of letters and other parcels ;10- disclos-
ing professional secrets;10s preventing or disturbing a public assembly;103
violating the right of suffrage ;11o preventing a citizen from filing a complaint
or petition ;111 preventing the publication and distribution of books, magazines,
newspapers and other printed matter ;"2 and violating copyright 113 or patent
rights."
4
Crimes against work relations. A socialist state considers work an important
social value. For that reason, the Code attaches special importance to work
relations and erects a separate category of criminal offenses for invasions of
this relationship. It is a crime not to observe the regulations dealing with
salaries, working hours, annual leave, 115 and social insurance.", The failure
of those responsible to comply with safety and hygienic measures constitutes
a social danger of sufficient magnitude to be encompassed by the Code. n17
Crimes against honor and reputation. Truth is a defense to a prosecution
for defamation. Belief in the truth of a false statement is likewise a defense
providing the error was "excusable" but the defendant may be convicted of
the lesser offenses of "insult" or "slight through reproach."' 18 Article 178
authorizes an interesting sanction in defamation cases. At the request of a
plaintiff who has been defamed in the press or by radio, the court may
require that its judgment of conviction be punished "in part or in extenso"
in the same manner as the offending statement at the cost of the defendant.
Crimes against personal dignity and morals. This chapter defines the crimes
of rape, seduction, obscenity, white slavery, and sexual deviations. It also
contains an answer to the challenging question whether the exploitation of
a woman's economic dependence for sexual purposes should be made a crime
and treated like rape." 9 Article 182 provides that whoever "through misuse
102. Art. 150.
103. Art. 151. 104. Art. 152.
105. Art. 154. 106. Art. 155.
107. Art. 156. 108. Art. 157.
109. Art. 158. 110. Art. 159.
111. Art. 161. 112. Art. 162.
113. Art. 163. 114. Art. 164.
115. Art. 165. 116. Art. 166.
117. Art. 167. 118. Art. 169.
119. The Soviet and Swiss Codes also give an affirmative answer to this question.
Even though the idea is accepted, it is difficult to find a suitable legislative formula. The
Criminal Code of the Russian Republic punishes "coercion" of a woman "by any parson
on whom she is dependent materially or by reason of her employment." Cnrmir.Ax. Co=n,
R.S.F.S.R., ART. 154. The Swiss Code provides that "whoever influences a woman to
copulate with him by abuse of her emergency or her dependency caused through an offi-
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of his position procures a female person subordinated or dependent upon him
to have carnal knowledge, shall be punished by detention for not more than
three years." The penalty for forcible rape is imprisonment for not more than
eight years. If the victim received grievous bodily injury or was killed the
punishment shall not be less than two years.120 Carnal knowledge with an
infirm person or a minor under fourteen years of age is punishable by de-
tention or by imprisonment for not more than five years.
121
Crimes against marriage and family. Included in this chapter are the crimes
of bigamy, abduction, incest, neglect and mistreatment of children, and non-
payment of alimony. The incest article is of special interest for two reasons:
(1) It is confined to intercourse between near blood-relations, i.e., "a relative
by blood in direct lineage or with brother or sister"; and, (2) the mildness
of the penalty, namely, detention.
1 22
Crimes against human health. Spreading an infectious disease ;123 communi-
cating a venereal disease ;124 unlawfully practicing medicine ;125 improperly
manufacturing, selling, and distributing medicines and drugs ;120 and pollut-
ing drinking water 127 are some of the offenses condemned in this chapter.
The penalty for practicing medicine without proper medical training is de-
tention for not more than one year and by a fine. The penalties for the other
offenses are similarly mild.
Crimes against national economy. In a planned economy where the state
is the chief organizer and director of economic life, the state will seek to
enforce its policies concerning the production and distribution of goods by
resorting to criminal sanctions. This chapter is one of the most important
and far reaching in the Code. It contains thirty-six separate articles-more
than any other chapter. Even such familiar crimes as counterfeiting, false
measuring, infesting livestock and plants with contagious diseases, and un-
lawful hunting and fishing take on a different orientation when considered
offenses against national economy. A series of articles applies to the "respon-
sible person in a state enterprise, cooperative or any other social enterprise."
Careless or conscious neglect of duty ;128 the manufacture of unusable pro-
ducts ;129 the distribution of deficient products ;I8o entering into detrimental
contracts ;131 favoring certain consumers over others ;12 and bartering 188 are
cial or an employment relation or through other similar situation, shall be confined in the
prison." Swiss FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, ART. 197.
120. Art. 179. 121. Art. 180, 181.
122. Art. 198. For a thoughtful discussion of the crime of incest, see MANNUREIM,
CRIMNAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL REcoNsRucrioN 77 (1946).
123. Art. 199. 124. Art. 201.
125. Art. 205. 126. Art. 205-209.
127. Art. 211. 128. Art. 213.
129. Art. 214. 130. Art. 215.
131. Art. 213-217. 132. Art. 228.
133. Art. 229.
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proscribed. Other articles concern the disclosure of economic secrets; 13-1 traf-
ficking in real estate without permission; 135 destroying or damaging dwell-
ings and business buildings ;13 forgery and counterfeiting;1ar falsely marking
goods ;'3s price violations ;139 hoarding and speculation ;"', failing to effect ob-
ligatory deliveries of agricultural products to the state ;'-" failing to cultivate
land and raise livestock ;1' destroying or damaging agricultural equipment,
crops, or cattle ;143 undermining cooperatives :144 and devastating forests.'4 5
Offenses against social and private property. The traditional offenses against
property of larceny, robbery, embezzlement, fraud,1 " extortion, blackmail
and receiving stolen property are included in this chapter. Although the arti-
cles defining these crimes make no distinction between private and social
property, an offense against social property 147 may indeed evoke a more severe
sanction. First of all, the behavior may fall within the ambit of an offense
defined in the chapters on offenses against the people and the state or against
the national economy. Also, specific provision is made for more severe punish-
ment when the subject of the offense is social property. For example, the
usual penalty for larceny is detention for not less than three years or im-
prisonment for not more than five years.148 However, if the property taken
was a machine, technical equipment, work tools from a factory, mine or work-
shop, military equipment, cattle, or provisions designed for distribution to
citizens, the penalty is imprisonment for not more than twelve years and the
offense is deemed "Grave Larceny."'14 In addition, article 255 dealing with
plunder overlaps the "Grave Larceny" article. It provides that when pro-
perty taken by larceny or embezzled by a public officer consists of "provisions,
industrial products, ration cards for food or industrial products, or any other
object of social property of particular significance for national economy or
supply of citizens, and the quantity of stolen or embezzled objects is so great
134. Art. 218.
135. Art. 219. 136. Art. 220.
137. Art. 221, 222. 13& Art. 225.
139. Art. 227. 140. Art. 233.
141. Art. 236. Notwithstanding the criminal sanction, Yugoslav authorities are ex-
periencing difficuties in obtaining deliveries of grain quotas from collective farms. The
primary source of trouble is "the attitude of the peasants and the appeasement of the
peasants by the local authorities." N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1951, p. 5, col. 1.
142. Art. 238. 143. Art. 239.
144. Art 240, 241. 145. Art. 246.
146. The fraud article (Art. 258) is interesting in that it makes the severity of the
sanction depend upon whether the offender was an amateur or whether he committed
the offense "as a professional practice."
147. Social property is defined in the General Part of the Code as "general people's
property, cooperative property and property of social organizations.' (Art. 99(5)).
Article 267 accords the same protection to property "entrusted to the State, cooperative
or a social organization or kept by them upon any legal basis.'
148. Art. 249. 149. Art. 250.
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that it obviously demonstrates disregard towards the community" the offender
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years. And if the plun-
der "causes particularly grave consequences for national economy or supply of
citizens, or the offence was committed under circumstances rendering it ex-
ceptionally grave, especially if it was committed by a group of persons or a
band, the offender shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten
years or by death."
Crimes against the general safety of persons. This chapter makes it criminal
to endanger life or property by fire, flood, explosions, and in conducting
industrial and construction projects. Negligence as well as intent is a basis
for liability.
Crimes against justice and crimes against public order and legal intercourse,
These chapters apply to a wide range of offenses many of which are unre-
lated. Offenses against justice include the failure to notify the authorities of
the preparation of criminal offenses or to notify them of committed offenses ;150
aiding an offender after the commission of a crime;161 making false criminal
charges ;152 perjury and false swearing ;153 and enabling prisoners to escape.'0 4
Some of the offenses against public order and legal intercourse are: pre-
venting an official from performing his duties ;lr inciting others to resist or
disobey legal decisions or state regulations;150 refusing to obey an order to
disperse ;157 gambling as a professional practice ;158 pettifoggery ;'" disturbing
religious rites ;160 and illegally possessing arms and explosives.101
Crimes against official duty. Officials are subject to a high degree of
criminal responsibility in the performance of their duties.1 2 Misuse of official
position is punishable by detention for not more than three years.10' Non-
feasance as well as the careless performance of official duties may result in
detention for not more than six months and if substantial damage results to
the state or the rights of citizens the detention may be increased to four
years.164 Other provisions penalize bribery;1 5 embezzlement ;100 and the dis-
closure of official secrets.
1 67
150. Art. 279, 280. 151. Art. 281.
152. Art. 282. 153. Art. 283.
154. Art. 287, 288. 155. Art. 289.
156. Art. 291. 157. Art. 292.
158. Art. 305. 159. Art. 310.
160. Art. 313. 161. Art. 301.
162. For a discussion of the abuse of power by officials in a state which proclaims
its socialist character, see Hazard, Socialinsm, Abuse of Power, and Soviet Law, 50 Co..
L. REv. 448 (1950), and Hazard, Soviet Socialism and Embearlcnewnt, 26 WAsh. L. RFv.
301 (1951).
163. Art. 314. 164. Art. 317.
165. Art. 325. 166. Art. 322, 323.
167. Art. 320.
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Military crimes. Military crimes are included in the criminal code."GS These
crimes are typical of articles of war generally. Except for such offenses as
assaulting a military person;lc9 failure to report for military service;'"0 and
failure to supply cattle or vehicles for military use,"' only military personnel
are subject to punishment for military crimes. Jurisdiction is in the regular
courts. Minister Frol explained the inclusion of military crimes in the crimi-
nal code as follows:
"It is customary to enact a separate criminal law for military crimi-
nal offences, but we are not adopting that practice since the prescrip-
tions of the General Part of the Criminal Code must primarily apply
to offences of this kind as well. Hence, if the military criminal offences
were to be dealt with by a separate law this would always entail the
utilization of two laws in the relevant proceedings. However, aside
from this purely technical reason for the inclusion of military criminal
offences into the general criminal code, there also arises a reason of
principle to favour this which is that our armed forces are a com-
ponent part of our people. It is comprehensible, necessary and justified
that separate provision should be made for criminal offences against
the armed forces for there exists a whole range of specific socially
dangerous pursuits aimed against the established order of our Services,
against their stability and combat capacity. The provisions made in a
separate chapter of the Criminal Code in regard to such criminal of-
fences reflect consideration for the characteristics of military service,
showing at the same time, though, that no line is drawn between the
members of our armed forces and our other citizens and that a uni-
form criminal code applies to all of them."" 2'
CONCLUSION
This examination of the Yugoslav Criminal Code has necessarily been more
descriptive than comparative and analytical. A comparative study by one not
familiar with the culture under scrutiny is likely to result in sterile concep-
tualistic comparisons."73 Identical propositions of law often bear quite dlf-
168. Military crimes are also included in the Russian Criminal Codes. Berman,
Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 YALE L. J. 803, 834 (1947).
169. Art. 331. 170. Art. 340, 341.
171. Art. 344.
172. Frol, A Summary of the Draft Criminal Code, 2 NEW YUGOSLAV L 4, 23
(1951).
173. Familiarity with the culture does not in itself assure a meaningful study. The
investigator should operate within a systematic framework of inquiry which attempts
to formulate the basic concepts and hypotheses of the legal system. Recognition should
be given not only to the empirical legal propositions but to the walue judgments as well.
A significant framework for communicating the present postulates, hypotheses, and
findings of political science is developed in LAsSWELL & KAPLAN, PowMs AND Soc="
(1950).
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ferent overtones in different legal systems. The variation is often explain-
able in terms of the respective traditions and values underlying the systems.
Furthermore, in every society there is a gulf between the law as written and
the law as practiced. A meaningful comparative study should take account
of institutional arrangements and practices. Not only should such variables
as personnel, administration and procedure be assessed, but an investigator
should realize that in authoritarian systems there is frequently a dual adminis-
tration of law. For instance, the political police and other special agencies
may be immune from the restrictions of the criminal code.
174
Nevertheless, certain observations are salvable from even a descriptive in-
quiry. The first is the pervasive character of the Yugoslav Code. Although
characteristic of a tightly planned economy this trait is by no means peculiar
to it. The United States has witnessed an ever growing resort to criminal
sanctions as mechanisms for maintaining and extending public order in the
arenas of trade and commerce, labor-management relations, national security,
and ideological conflicts. And, with us, the criminal law is expansive in an-
other respect. While our compilations of criminal laws generally deal only
with the common crimes and their penalties there are numerous other criminal
provisions lodged elsewhere. Regulatory statutes, in particular, authorize cri-
minal sanctions either as an alternative or for use in conjunction with civil
ones.
Notions of "social danger" and "measures of social defense" are not entire-
ly foreign to criminological thought in this country. Punishment is no longer
discussed exclusively in terms of vengeance, retribution and expiation. We
are beginning to speak of social protection through deterrence and rehabili-
tation, when possible, and otherwise through incapacitation.'"h The criminal
law is no longer regarded as primarily the protector of individual rights and
interests. Its function is also the protection of the rights and interests of the
community. Furthermore, we are beginning to look upon the criminal law
174. The Soviet dual system ,has been described as follows:
"Entirely outside of this judicial hierarchy stand the Ministry of the Interior and
the Ministry of State Security. Let the element of sabotage or counterrevolution
be introduced, and the Ministry of the Interior, through a 'Special Board,' takes
over. Here the trial is administrative and secret. Judging from reports of those
who have experienced these trials, defense counsel are not allowed, there is no
right of appeal, and conviction is almost certain, regardless of the truth of the
charges."
BERmAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 84 (1950). Also consult, Starosolsky, Basic Principles
of Soviet Criminal Law, 28 N.C.L. Rav. 359, 360 (1950); HAZARD, SoVIET LAW AND
ITS Assu TuIoNS IN IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 204 (Northrop ed.
1949).
A similar practice prevailed in Nazi Germany. Kirchheimer, Criminal Law ill National
Socialist Germany, 8 STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL Sci. 444, 452-6 (1939).
175. See Dession, Justice after Conviction, 25 CONN. B. J. 215 (1951).
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as a creative social force, as a technique for maximizing the values of our
society.176
The definitions of the familiar crimes in Yugoslav law differ only slightly
from those of Anglo-American law. However, the penalties prescribed for
these crimes are less severe than in the United States. The numerous pro-
visions in the Yugoslav Code dealing with group crimes manifest a conception
of group criminality which closely approaches the Anglo-American law of
conspiracy.'
77
There are several interesting deviations from Anglo-American law. One
is the treatment of sexual intercourse induced by economic coercion as a form
of rape. Force is an essential element in the American law of rape. The force
need not be physical but may be supplied by threats or, in some cases, by
fraud. The threats must be of death or great bodily harm. Economic intimi-
dation is not sufficient. 178 For a number of reasons, the range of sex offenses
should not be broadened in this country. In the first place, Professor Kinsey
and his associates have revealed the high incidence of illicit sexual behavior
in the American male. Their study documents the hypocritical disparity be-
tween private acceptance of and participation in this behavior and the public
rejection of it.'7 9 The lack of witnesses to alleged sex offenses makes them
singularly susceptible to false complaints which, because of judge and jury
bias in favor of the complaining witness, are frequently sustained. Too, what
appears on the surface to be a straightforward and convincing story is often
the fabrication of a disturbed personality. 80 The complainant may be moti-
vated by revenge, a desire for notoriety, or her false complaint may be an
attempt to escape public censure for known illicit sexual behavior. Another
type of complainant is the hysteric for whom the false charge serves a wish-
fulfillment function.' 8 ' The present rules of evidence hinder rather than aid
a proper inquiry into the veracity of complaints of sexual misconduct. Until
they are liberalized to permit adequate probing of the personality of com-
176. This point is developed in MANVHErI, CRIrINAL JUSTiC A ID SecIAL RE-
coNsTRucrioN 195, 259-70 (1946).
177. Mr. Justice Jackson's dictum that the concept of conspiracy "does not commend
itself to jurists of civil law countries" [Krulevitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 450
(1949)] may be correct conceptualistically but more careful studies have shown that the
prosecution of similar combinations is not unknown to the civil law. Wagner, Conspiracy
in CRil Law Countries, 42 J. CRM. L. & CnM-noOGY 171 (1951); Arens, Nuremberg
and Group Prosecution, 1951 VAsH. U. L. Q. 329.
178. Submission under compulsion of parental command has been held forcible. State
v. Dawson, 88 S.C. 225, 70 S.E. 721 (1911).
179. KIN sy, Po.Fno" & MARTIN, SExuAL BEHAVIOR in THE HMAN MAE
(1948).
180. The pioneer study in this field is HE.LY, PATHOLoGIcAL LYING, AccusAT-ioN,
AND SWINDLING (1905).
181. For a discussion of the hysteria neurosis, see Noms, MODMNs CI.nucAL Psy-
cHIATRY 283 (3d ed. 1949). Also, see 3 WiGmOPE, EvmsNcs § 924a (1940).
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plaining witnesses, sex crimes should not be extended but narrowed in
scope.
182
Good Samaritan statutes raise the basic question whether the criminal law
should compel active benevolence between man and man.188 In Anglo-
American law a person who is under no "legal duty" to render care and at-
tention to another, whatever may be his ethical duty, is not guilty of man-
slaughter if death results from his neglect. Absent a legal duty there is no
criminal omission.184 Nevertheless, there is a substantial body of criminal
law which brings various omissions within the scope of penal liability. The
least questioned concerns the immediate family relationship. Nor have the
courts had any difficulty in finding a "legal duty" arising out of such tradi-
tional relationships as master and servant, guardian and ward, captain and
crew, nurse and patient, jailer and convict. In these there is no uncertainty
as to what duties are required nor upon whom the duty rests, Judicial ex-
tension of these categories is deterred by the understandable reluctance of the
courts to subject a "stranger" to the same penalty that would be imposed on
a close relative. Legal reform must come, therefore, through legislation pro-
viding an entirely different category for "strangers" and prescribing lighter
penalties. Livingston proposed that one should be considered guilty of homi-
cide who neglects to save life when he could do so "without personal danger,
182. The evidentiary problem is discussed in Note, Psychiatric Aid in Evaluating
the Credibility of a Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 IND. L. J. 98 (1950); State
v. Wesler, 137 N.J.L. 311, 59 A.2d 834 (1948), 39 J. CRIer. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 750
(1949) ; Yessen v. State, 228 Ind. 316, 92 N.E. 2d 621 (1950). A more general evaluation
is Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation. of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L. J.
1324 (1950).
183. Bentham supported his proposal for a Good Samaritan law by the following
hypothetical cases: "A woman's head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a man, instead
of assisting to quench the fire, looks on, and laughs at it. A drunken man, falling with
his face downwards into a puddle, is in danger of suffocation: lifting his head a little
on one side would save him: another man sees this and lets him die. A quantity of gun-
powder lies scattered about a room: a man is going into it with a lighted candle: another,
knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is there that in any of these cases
would think punishment misapplied?" BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO TILE PRINCIPLES 0F
MORALS AND LEGISLATiON, c .17, § 19 at 323, n. 1 (1879).
184. The tautological character of this aphorism is exposed in HALL, GENRAL
PRINcIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 250 (1946).
The French Code contains a provision similar to the Yugoslav article, In its first
decision under this section, the highest court of France recently held it to apply to a
physician who failed to answer an emergency call, although his acquittal was affirmed
on the ground that he had not been apprised of the peril with sufficient certainty to
make his failure "voluntary' Note, 63 HARv. L. Ray. 886 (1950).
The Yugoslav Code has a separate article dealing with physicians. Article 204 pro-
vides that a "physician who contrary to his professional duty refuses to offer medical
assistance to a sick person whose life is directly endangered, shall be punished by fine
or by detention for not more than two years."
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or pecuniary loss."'u 5 And Ames suggested a similar rule.180 Beginnings have
been made by statutes requiring motorists 17 and railroad employees to aid
persons injured by them, and a Federal statute 18 8 requires the master of a
vessel "so far as he can do so without serious danger to his own vessel, crew,
or passengers," to "render assistance to every person who is found at sea in
danger of being lost."
Prosecutions for criminal libel are more frequent on the Continent than in
the United States. 29 This perhaps accounts for Article 178 of the Yugoslav
Code which authorizes a court to require publication of its judgment of con-
viction in libel cases. In a similar vein are the press laws of many European
and South American countries which supplement the civil action for libel by
permitting a person attacked in the press to publish an immediate reply in
the offending publication. 3 In the United States it is a brave man indeed
who launches a libel suit. Not only is vindication hampered by inadequate
and obsolete doctrine, but he can rarely match the financial resources of news-
paper or radio defendants in pre-trial preparation and in retaining expert
counsel. And even though he should win, the judgment in his favor seldom
comes to the attention of the people who read or heard the libel and who
still remain under the impression created by the offending publication. He
is met by a conspiracy of silence on the part of the press since libel suits
against newspapers, by professional courtesy, are rarely reported. Elsewhere,
I have urged the adoption of the right of reply in this country as an alter-
native for an action for libel.1 91
The Yugoslav government has not only ratified the Convention on Geno-
cide 1 2 but has implemented it by incorporating the crime with severe penal-
185. LIVINGSTON, CODE OF CRIMES AND PU NISHMENTS, Art. 4S4 (1833).
186. Ames, Law and Morals, "_ Hamv. L. RE%. 97, 113 (1903): "One who fails to
interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when he might
do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great bodily harm
follows as a consequence of such inaction, shall be punished criminally and shall make
compensation to the party injured or to his widow and cfildren in case of death."
187. For example, CONN. GEN. STAT. (1949 Rev.) § 2410 provides:
"Each person operating a motor vehicle who knowingly causes injury, whether or
not resulting in death, to any other person... shall at once stop and render such
assistance as may be needed...."
A penalty of a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $100 or imprisonment for not
more than one year or both may be imposed.
188. 46 U.S.C. § 728. A fine not exceeding $1000 or imprisonment not exceeding two
years, or both, may be inflicted.
189. Riesman, Democracy & Defamation, 42 CoL. L. REv. 727, 745, (1942).
190. These laws are discussed in Donnelly, The Right of Reply,: A*. Alterathe to
an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L Rv. 867 (1948).
191. Ibid.
192. Pertinent portions of the Convention text are printed as an appendix to Com-
ment, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YAUS L J. 1142, 1157 (1949).
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ties into its Criminal Code. Conscious of the legal shortcomings of the Nurem-
berg trial which held that only group extermination carried on during the war
was punishable, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted
this Convention. This Convention has not been ratified by the United States
much to the satisfaction of the American Bar Association and the Editor-in-
Chief, Mr. George A. Finch, of the influential American Journal of Inter-
national Law.'93 At its September, 1949, meeting the House of Delegates of
the Bar Association solemnly resolved "that the suppression and punishment
of Genocide under an international convention to which it is proposed the
United States shall be a party involves important constitutional questions"
and "that the proposed convention raises important fundamental questions
but does not resolve them in a manner consistent with our form of Govern-
ment." It recommended "that the convention on Genocide now before the
United States Senate be not approved as submitted.' 04 Able scholars have
demonstrated the vacuousness of these fulminations.l95 The real issue is
whether the United States has the moral courage to assume leadership in
this humanitarian endeavor and whether it will avail itself of this opportunity
to reaffirm before the world its dedication to fundamental human dignity.
A feature of the Yugoslav Code which deserves serious consideration in
this country is "Rehabilitation." This device which erases a criminal con-
viction is available following both the service of sentence and a specific period
during which no new offense is committed. This raises a basic question. Who
is a criminal? The most simple answer is: A person who commits a crime.
But this merely raises additional questions. How long is a person who com-
mits a crime a criminal? Is it only while he is committing the crime, until
he has "paid the penalty," or for the remainder of his life? These questions
are difficult to answer only because the word "criminal" is used to stigmatize
law violators and because it is applied only to those who are ostracized by
society. In this country, a man who has committed a crime and has been con-
victed usually remains a criminal all his life. Even an innocent person who
has been erroneously convicted must ordinarily resort to a pardon for relief
if the term of court has expired and if the time for filing a motion for a
new trial has lapsed.' 96 But a pardon is inadequate since it does not affect
193. See 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 732 (1949). In a lead editorial entitled "The Genocide
Convention," Mr. Finch approves and attempts to justify the action of the Bar Asso-
ciation.
194. The resolution appears in A.B.A. SECrIoN or INTaRNATIONA AND COMPARA-
TivE LAW, REPORT AND RCoMrENDATioNs (1949) and in A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM
ON PEACE AND LAw THROUGH UNITED NATIONS, REPORT (1949).
195. See, e.g., MeDougal & Arens, Tie Genocide Convention and the Conslifuiloft
3 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1950); SCHROEDER, INTERNATIONAL CRrME AND THE U.S. CON-
STITUTION (1950).
196. See, United States v. Kaplan, 101 F.Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Although the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure recommended
that there be no time limitations where a motion for new trial is based on newly dis-
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the record fact of guilt. Despite pardon, a conviction may still be the basis
for discrediting a witness,' 97 disbarring an attorney, refusing an application
for naturalization, or withholding a license to engage in a business. And the
New York Court of Appeals reluctantly applied an "habitual criminal" statute
to a person pardoned for innocence.18 Since the courts usually fail to dis-
tinguish between pardons for innocence and pardons for other reasons the
foregoing disabilities apply, a fortiori, in the latter case.
A few jurisdictions have attempted to improve the lot of the wrongfully
convicted by providing for indemnity '8 9 and a recent New York statute 23
provides that when a pardon by the governor is based on a finding of inno-
cence from evidence discovered after the judgment of conviction and after
the time for a motion for a new trial, upon motion the judgment of convic-
tion must be set aside and the indictment dismissed by the court in which
the defendant was convicted. This "shall place the defendant in the same
position as if the indictment ... had been dismissed at the conclusion of the
trial by the court because of the failure to establish the defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt."2 1
In this country, a guilty person, as well as an erroneously convicted one,
may obtain a pardon.2 0 2 Some legal writers have suggested that a distinction
covered evidence, Rule 33 of the Federal Rules, as promulgated by the Court, limits the
time to two years after final judgment. The writer can suggest no sufficient reason why
relief against erroneous criminal convictions should be barred by time limitations.
197. Although the original conviction may be used to impeach a witness, the pardon
may be introduced for purposes of rehabilitation, the credibility of the witness being left
to the jury. United States v. Richards, 91 F.Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1950), 25 TuLt.E L
REv. 281 (1951), aff'd, 192 F2d 602 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
The Yugoslav Code provides that a pardon erases the conviction. (Art. 86).
198. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E. 2d 468 (1941). See also Groseclose
v. Pluinmer, 106 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1939) (pardon on grounds other than innocence).
And see Note, Effect of Pardrns for Innocence under "Habitual Crim:inal" Statutes, 51
YAi.E L. J. 699 (1942).
199. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513. For the history of this and similar state
statutes, see Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U.L Rnv.
201 (1941); BoRcHA D, Co mraNG TE INNOoENT (1932). The operation of the New
York statute is reviewed in 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. RE. 422 (1946).
200. N.Y. Laws 1946, c.60., N.Y. Conz oF Cma. P. § 697 (McXinney, 1951 Cum.
Supp.).
201. A Note in 59 -fARv. L. Rnv. 1174 (1946) suggests that this statute may encoun-
ter constitutional difficulties as violating the principle of separation of powers. A related
question is the validity of legislative pardons. On the latter, see Weihofen, Legislatiro
Pardons, 27 CALiu. L. REV. 371 (1939) ; and Radin, Legislative Pardons: Another View,
27 CAsa. L. Rnv. 387 (1939).
202. An offender may apply for a pardon after completing his sentence for the pur-
pose of restoring those rights which were lost as a result of the conviction. Rule 16 of
the Rules Governing Petitions for the Executive Clemency, approved January 19, 1946,
provides that a petition for a presidential pardon after completion of a sentence will not
19521
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
be made between a pardon for innocence and a pardon for other reasons. In
the former case the pardon should "blot out" guilt and make the recipient
"as innocent as if he had never committed the offense." 20 3 In the case of a
pardon for other reasons, they urge, the fact of the crime should not be ob-
literated since guilt is conceded.
20 4
The Yugoslav rehabilitation is for the guilty. The closest approach to it
in this country is Section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code 205 which pro-
vides, in substance, that where a defendant has satisfactorily completed the
period of probation, the information against him may be dismissed, or if he
has pleaded guilty, theplea shall be changed to not guilty; and the defendant
"shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from
the offense or crime of which he has been convicted." However, "in any
subsequent prosecution of such defendant for any other offense, such prior
conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if
probation had not been granted or the accusation or information dismissed."
Thus, satisfactory completion of probation wipes out the conviction. However,
if the defendant subsequently commits an offense, the earlier conviction is
revived. For example, the conviction is reinstated and counts as a prior con-
viction if the defendant is subsequently convicted ;200 if he is subsequently
prosecuted for another offense and takes the witness stand, the former con-
be referred for reports unless the petitioner has been released from custody not less than
three years and is not on parole or probation. A longer period may be required de-
pending on the nature of the offense and the character of the petitioner. In cases of
perjury, for example, a period of five years after release is usually required. Rule 16
is cited in United States v. Richard, 91 F.Supp, 323, 324 n. 3 (D.DC. 1950), aff'd, 192
F.2d 602 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
203. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U.S. 1866).
204. Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L REv. 177 (1939).
205. The complete text is as follows:
"Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire
period thereof, or who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the
termination of the period thereof, shall at any time thereafter be permitted by the
court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; or if he has
been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of
guilty; and in either case the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or in-
formation against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penal-
ties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been con-
victed. The probationer shall be informed of this right and privilege in his pro-
bation papers. The probationer may make such application and change of plea
in person or by attorney, or by the probation officer authorized in writing; pro-
vided, that in any subsequent prosecution of such defendant for any other offense,
such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect
as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or information dismissed."
CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1203.4 (.Deering, 1951).
206. People v. Hainline, 219 Cal. 532, 28 P.2d 16 (1933); People v. Barwick, 7
Cal. 2d 696, 62 P.2d 590 (1936).
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viction may be used for impeachment purposes ;eo7 the provision is expressly
made non-applicable in disbarment proceedings;208 and the conviction must
be considered in suspending or revoking a driver's license. 2 9 And a recent
decision held that the state medical board was authorized to suspend a phy-
sician's license for "unprofessional conduct" on the ground that Section 1203.4
did not wipe out the conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Sus-
pension from a profession was not deemed a penalty or disability released
by the statute.
2 10
The California statute has been so riddled with exceptions as to emasculate
its value as an unconvicting device. Such a statute, without exceptions, ad-
ministered by conscientious courts and adequate probation personnel would
serve a useful and humanitarian purpose. Why shouldn't an offender be given
a clean slate if he has been able to readjust to civilian life and has been a
law-abiding citizen for a reasonable period?
Only an examination of the actual operation of the Yugoslav Criminal
Code will disclose its real value to that country. In any event many of its
provisions, whatever the results there, are worthy of careful consideration
for possible application to American problems in criminal law.
207. People v. James, 40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 105 P.2d 947 (1940). However, if he
appears as a witness in other litigation and not as a defendant, the former conviction
apparently cannot be used. People v. Mackey, 58 Cal. App. 123, 203 Pac. 135 (1922).
208. CA-s. Bus. PROF. CODE. § 6102, codifying It re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P2d
344 (1941).
209. CAL. VsH. CoDn § 309 (Deering, 1948).
210. Meyer v. Afedical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1035 (1949) (4-3 de-
cision), criticized in Note, 23 So. C iF. L. REv. 109 (1949).
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